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Abstract
This paper describes the basic concepts of error diagnostics and an associated rule system whose application
helps to identify potential hardware/software locations of errors which caused a failure observed while
executing tests of embedded systems. Further on, an overview over the “Avionics Smoke Detection System”
is given, where the main algorithms have been applied. The methods, techniques and tools described here
rely on the preceding investigations performed with respect to signal ﬂow and the observation of causal
chains in distributed test benches during test suite executions. These results have been elaborated in the
KATO project within the German aerospace research programme LUFO III.
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1 Introduction
This document describes the results achieved by the University of Bremen, TZI,
for KATO-TP13 work packages “Speciﬁcation of conditions for error diagnostics”
and “Implementation of an error diagnostic prototype”. With almost ten years of
experience in the area of test and veriﬁcation of avionics controllers all kinds of
faults, errors and anomalies have been observed and detected by our workgroup.
The obvious next step is to classify the encountered faults. Based on the fault models
commonly used in semiconductor fault diagnostics[1][6] we applied these models and
methods and provide a complete strategy for locating faults in distributed embedded
systems within their environments. The methods, techniques and tools illustrated
here rely on preceding investigations, which have been documented in [7].
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Due to legal constraints we cannot present “real” source code, but instead we
illustrate our methods for error diagnostics with a slightly simpliﬁed and abstracted
example of a real system. The System Under Test (SUT) and its testing environment
are depicted in Fig. 1 and introduced in the paragraphs below.
Fig. 1. Testing scenario
A simpliﬁed version of an aircraft smoke detection system is used as the SUT. Its
model, which is assumed to be correct, and the corresponding faulty implementation
are described in Section 2. The central control unit (smoke/ﬁre detection control
unit (SDCU)) contains an error similar to one of those errors found during “real”
controller testing.
The SDCU is connected to the cockpit via a bus system called Avionics Full
Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX), which is commonly used in modern aircraft.
This bus is used to send the alarm states of the compartments to the cockpit. These
messages are pictured as arrows, leading from the SDCU to the cockpit.
However, to emphasize the fault, the reporting message is made visible in the
test scenario overview. The faulty part is marked by a red arrow.
To keep the overview short and simple, the ﬂow of the messages from the SDCU
to the sensors – and vice versa – are not shown. They are routed within the two
CAN buses A and B.
The implementation is embedded into a testing and simulation environment,
using Veriﬁed’s RT-Tester tool[12]. The resulting testing environment and the test
suite executed therein are described in Section 3. In Section 4, the application of the
diagnostic tool kit described in the preceding chapters is illustrated for the purpose
of identifying the causes and locations of the test failures observed.
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2 SDF SUT Model and Implementation
The system consists of (see Fig. 1 above) the following items:
• The smoke detectors (SD) measure humidity, smoke and temperature at des-
ignated locations in the aircraft and transmit smoke/ﬁre alarms and other status
information on a CAN bus system.
• The smoke detection control unit (SDCU) collects sensor data from vari-
ous busses and distributes alarms and other messages to the cockpit (and other
systems).
• The communication media consist of
· CAN busses for SD ↔ SDCU communication,
· AFDX bus for SDCU ↔ Cockpit communication,
· discrete I/O lines for cockpit indications.
Observe that real smoke detection systems use several additional communication
interfaces, in particular, aural and visual indication to the aircraft cabin. For the
purpose of illustrating our concepts for error diagnostics, however, these interfaces
and their associated additional functionality are not relevant. The central SUT
component is the SDCU controller. One of the most important SDCU methods
is processMessages(). Here, the decisions whether to raise compartment smoke
alarms are made. In the correctly modelled system the alarm status of compartment
c depends on the conjunction of local alarm states. For compartment Comp1 the
states of the sensors SD1 to SD4 are evaluated. Two sensors are used for the
compartments Comp2 to Comp4 respectively. This leads to the following alarm
equations:
• Comp1:
compAlarm[1] = (sensorSDSAlarm[1] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[2])∨
(sensorSDSAlarm[3] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[4])
• Comp2 . . . Comp4:
compAlarm[c] = sensorSDSAlarm[2c + 1] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[2c + 2],
c ∈ {2 . . . 4}
However, the SUT implementation contains an error: For compartment Comp2,
the alarm decision depends on sensorSDSAlarm[5] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[13] in-
stead of sensorSDSAlarm[5] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[6]. In the diagnostic procedure
described below, this failure will be referred to as Failure.
3 SDF Testing Environment
In this document we focus on system integration testing, so the tests will typically
be
• Black-box tests on controller level: Since controllers have been tested by their
suppliers during the mandatory HW/SW integration test suite, the system tests
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will deal with controllers as black-boxes.
• Black-box tests on peripheral device level (same reason as for controllers).
• Grey-box tests with respect to inter-controller communications: During system
integration testing, network monitors are typically available to record at least a
portion of the data exchange between communicating controllers. For example,
AFDX monitors and ARINC 429 monitors can be used to record snapshots or
speciﬁc types of data packages. Some communications, however, often cannot
be observed, such as, for example, the data exchange between redundant fault-
tolerant controllers.
• Grey-box tests with respect to controller ↔ device communication: Just like
inter-controller communications, the data exchange between controllers and their
directly connected peripherals can be – at least partially – observed using bus
monitors (e. g. monitors for CAN busses, ARINC 429 busses), or measurement
equipment (e. g. for discrete and analogue I/O interfaces).
The RT-Tester tool can be used for all kinds of tests – from unit level tests to
hardware/software integration tests (described in [5]). However, in this document
we focus on system integration tests, and all mentioned tests were executed using
this tool.
4 Diagnostic Procedure
4.1 Step 1: Initial Black-Box Test Results
A diagnostic procedure is always triggered by a discrepancy observed during a test
suite. The failure – contained in the SDCU itself – is detected during a functional
test of compartment smoke alarms in compartment Comp2.
The initial values for the compartments are shown in the ﬁrst test log. The
values for humidity and smoke are recorded as percent values. The temperature is
given in degrees Celsius.
TM 00027023005 AM 4 O : ( 25 ) ENVIRONMENT:
: ----------------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: HUMIDITY: 5 5 5 5
: SMOKE: 2 2 2 2
: TEMP: 20 20 20 20
The test environment simulates a relevant smoke and slight temperature increase
for Comp2, which is recorded in the test execution protocol as
TM 00029035001 AM 4 O : ( 27 ) ENVIRONMENT:
: ----------------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: HUMIDITY: 5 5 5 5
: SMOKE: 90 90 90 2
: TEMP: 30 30 30 20
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The threshold values for alarms are at 80% for smoke and 65◦ for temperature.
Therefore an alarm must be reported for three diﬀerent compartments: Comp1,
Comp2 and Comp3. However, no alarm is reported for the compartment Comp2:
TM 00034035267 AM 4 O : ( 32 ) SDCU:
: --------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
This test step shows that after 5 seconds (timestamp unit: microseconds), there
is still no smoke alarm for compartment Comp2, leading to test failure.
4.2 Step 2: Interface Analysis – Generation of the Causal Graph – Version 1
The causal graph shows all components and interfaces that may possibly inﬂuence
the values passed along interface compAlarm[2]. For the version 1 representation
of the graph all components which are physically connected are considered, because
bridging faults 4 in components may result in arbitrary data ﬂows, as long as a
physical connection is available. As soon as certain types of internal component
faults can be excluded, the causal graph may be narrowed, leading to new versions.
Conversely, a more detailed analysis of a potentially faulty component may require
to analyse its internal data ﬂow. This leads to a reﬁnement of the causal graph
version n, where a component node C in version n is replaced by a detailed data ﬂow
network representing communications within C and leading to a new version n+1 of
the graph. The initial version of the causal graph for the failure detected on interface
compAlarm[2] is shown in Fig. 2. The graph contains cycles, because messages
are transported from smoke/ﬁre detectors to the SDCU and vice versa, and the
messages from SDCU to SDs can also inﬂuence the state on interface compAlarm[2]:
For example, if the SDCU would fail to poll sensors SD5 and SD6, then no alarm
messages would be sent from SD5 and SD6 to the SDCU.
Fig. 2. Causal graph, version 1, for Failure
4 For integrated circuits this is discussed in [10, pp. 335ﬀ]
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4.3 Step 3: Interface Analysis – Generation of the Fault Tree
The fault tree[8][11, pp. 43ﬀ] constructed in Step 3 depicts the possible error hy-
potheses, together with the boundary conditions which must hold in order to make
a hypothetical error cause the observed failure on the interface between SUT and
testing environment. The error classiﬁcation used for each component follows the
fault models introduced in [7, pp. 13ﬀ] and the fault tree construction technique
described in [7, pp. 6ﬀ]. In the diagnostic procedure described here we omit the
possibility of an external intruder (see [7]) because we are dealing with a closed
system whose components are well-known.
Fig. 3. Fault tree associated with interface analysis for Failure
Following the paths in the causal graph of Fig 2, we can immediately derive
the ﬁrst levels of the fault tree, as depicted in Fig. 3: The failure on output inter-
face compAlarm[2] might be directly caused by an internal SDCU failure or by an
erroneous input on the interfaces i1, i13 between SDCU and the CAN bus. SDCU-
internal failures may either cause faulty transformations from i1- and i13-inputs to
compAlarm[2] outputs or by output faults on interfaces i2 and i14, which may in
turn cause unexpected smoke detector behaviour, so that the alarm messages of
the crucial detectors SD5, SD6 are either not sent at all or not accepted by the
SDCU. Faulty input values to a correctly operating SDCU may either be caused
by a failure of the CAN bus or by sensor failures. Since compartment alarms indi-
cated on output compAlarm [c], c ∈ {1 . . . 4} require that both 5 associated sensors
SD(2c+1), SD(2c+2) signal an alarm, the crucial sensors for the observed failure
on compAlarm[2] are SD5 and SD6.
Reﬁning the possibilities of SDCU processing failures on interface i1 and i13 leads
to fault sub-tree 4: Not showing fault-types which are a priori highly improbable
5 Comp1 is an exception: there are four sensors installed
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Fig. 4. Fault sub-tree associated with potential SDCU processing failures on interface i1 which might cause
Failure
leaves us with 5 potential types of fault (as classiﬁed in [3, chap. 7]):
(i) Bridging faults would arise if – due to internal interface errors of the
SDCU – the compAlarm[2] output could be inﬂuenced by the values of other
inputs which should be disregarded in a correctly operating SUT: If the
SDCU used the wrong sensors (SD1,2,3,4,7,8,9,10) to determine the output
on compAlarm[2] and these sensors were not in alarm state, then no compart-
ment alarm would be raised on compAlarm[2].
(ii) Signal deletion errors would arise if the i1 or i13 input would not be
relayed internally to the SDCU sub-component responsible for raising the
compAlarm[2] compartment alarm.
(iii) Stuck-at-0 faults occur if the guard condition for raising compAlarm[2] to 1
were faulty, so that it always evaluates to false.
(iv) An action failure would arise if the assignment of the new value 1 to
compAlarm[2] were faulty.
(v) A missing transition failure would arise if inputs from sensors SD5 and SD6
on interface i1, i13 would simply not trigger any action at all.
Observe that the fault tree can be set up incrementally, so that extensions of
leaves are only performed after other branches of the tree have been pursued which
did not help to uncover the failure under investigation. We will therefore analyse
the potential SDCU failures further, before reﬁning the other branches of the initial
fault tree 3.
4.4 Step 4: Falsiﬁcation of Fault Hypotheses
After the fault tree associated with the interface analysis has been elaborated, the
fault hypotheses implied by nodes of the tree can be falsiﬁed one by one, until the
cause for the observed failure has been identiﬁed. Falsiﬁcation can be performed by
(i) analysing additional data recorded during the test,
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(ii) performing additional system integration tests designed to verify/falsify a spe-
ciﬁc fault hypothesis,
(iii) performing additional lower-level tests (e. g. HW/SW integration tests or unit
tests), in order to observe additional interfaces which were not visible on system
integration test level,
(iv) code execution or interpretation using concrete values,
(v) abstract code interpretation using interval values (like described in [2],
(vi) informal or formal code analysis (inspection, formal veriﬁcation etc.).
Obviously, method 1 is the most preferable one since it neither requires addi-
tional tests nor source code availability. Following the fault model from [7], it will
now be analysed how speciﬁc tests can be used to falsify fault hypotheses associated
with a given type of error.
4.4.1 Falsiﬁcation tests for bridging faults.
Bridging faults imply that unintended inputs xi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . to the erroneous com-
ponent inﬂuence a certain output y in an illegal way. A falsiﬁcation test therefore
consists of systematically changing the inputs xi and observing whether a certain
combination can illegally stimulate output changes on y. For the potential bridging
faults of the SDCU as depicted in Fig. 4 the interpretation is as follows, as can be
seen from the fault tree:
• If the observed error is due to a bridging fault from Comp1 sensor values to Comp2
sensor values, then it can only arise if sensors SD1,2,3,4 are not in ALARM state:
Otherwise we would observe a correct output compAlarm[2]=1, though illegally
caused by the wrong sensors SD1,2,3,4.
• Similarly, if the observed error is due to a bridging fault from Comp3 sensor
values to Comp2 sensor values, then it can only arise if sensors SD7,8 are not in
ALARM state.
• Analogously, if the observed error is due to a bridging fault from Comp4 sensor
values to Comp2 sensor values, then it can only arise if sensors SD9,10 are not in
ALARM state.
Analysing the test execution log, we see that when the output failure
compAlarm[2]=0 is observed, sensors SD1,2,3,4 are already in state ALARM, and
the Comp1 alarm has been indicated correctly. As a consequence, there can be no
bridging fault from Comp1 sensor values to Comp2 sensor values. Also, the sensors
SD6,7 are in state ALARM and the compartment alarm for Comp3 is displayed:
there can be no bridging fault from Comp3 to Comp2 either. The simulated envi-
ronment for all compartments show that the thresholds for smoke are exceeded in
the compartments Comp1, Comp2 and Comp3 (see log at timestamp 00029035001
μs, p. 5). The log at timestamp 00034035267 μs (see p. 5) shows that no alarm was
detected for Comp2.
TM 00029024572 AM 4 O : ( 27 ) SENSORS SDS:
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: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
: DEFECT: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Unfortunately, the sensors SD9,10 were still in state STANDBY when the fail-
ure occurred, so the test run could not exclude the bridging fault from Comp4
sensor values to Comp2 sensor values: We need an additional test where the sen-
sors SD9,10 are permanently in state ALARM. If this does not lead to an output
compAlarm[2]=1, this also excludes the second potential bridging fault.
Test: Bridging
In this test, the environment for compartment Comp4 is set in a way that the
installed sensors will report an alarm. This can be read from the execution log at
timestamp 00029028720 μs.
TM 00029028720 AM 4 O : ( 27 ) ENVIRONMENT:
: ----------------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: HUMIDITY: 5 5 5 5
: SMOKE: 90 90 90 90
: TEMP: 30 30 30 30
The Sensors SD9,10 are set to state alarm, which is reported at timstamp
00029029193 μs.
TM 00029029193 AM 4 O : ( 27 ) SENSORS SDS:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
: DEFECT: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
As expected, the SDCU sets the alarm for compartment Comp4.
TM 00029029894 AM 4 O : ( 27 ) SDCU:
: --------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 1
As shown in this test, the occurrence of a bridging fault can be excluded.
4.4.2 Falsiﬁcation tests for signal deletion errors.
Systematic tests for falsiﬁcation of signal deletion errors can be designed and exe-
cuted if the SUT has the following proven property:
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If signal value v0 is correctly transmitted over interface i, then value v1 must be
correctly transmitted, too.
Such a hypothesis is fulﬁlled 6 , for example, if i is a shared variable interface and
all messages placed into i have the same length and a checksum, allowing to detect
corrupted (in particular, truncated) messages.
If the hypothesis holds, an additional test stimulating v0 can be executed. If
it passed then this implies that v1 was not lost within the SUT. In our case, the
hypothesis is fulﬁlled by the SUT implementation. Therefore an additional test can
be created where another state value of sensors SD5,6 is stimulated, for instance
with a FAILURE state. When the sensors transmit the state failed, the SDCU is
expected to mark the sensors as failed. If this occurs, we have proven that sensor
state changes of SD5,6 are not lost within the SDCU. Since the SUT implementation
really shows the expected messages, a signal deletion error can be excluded.
Test: Signal-deletion
In this test, the sensors SD5,6 constantly send the state failure to the SDCU.
The internal state of the sensors is not modiﬁed, just the value in the request frame
is adjusted. As it is recorded at TM 00029031597 μs, the sensors are marked failed.
Therefore the occurrence of a signal deletion fault can be excluded.
TM 00029031597 AM 4 O : ( 27 ) SDCU:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
4.4.3 Falsiﬁcation tests for path delay errors.
A path delay error occurs when the speciﬁed transition is not completely lost, but
occurs too late and/or needs an additional stimulus to be triggered. This type
of error would be revealed by waiting for a suﬃciently long time for the expected
output to occur (of course, an upper bound must be known to perform this test),
and toggling the inputs in a way that should stimulate a sequence of output value
changes instead of only one change. In our case, the additional test would consist
of exercising an input sequence on the Comp2 temperature and smoke status which
would result in a sequence of ALARM → STANDBY → ALARM → STANDBY →
. . . state changes of sensors SD5,6.
6 It is not fulﬁlled, for example, if signal value v0 is a low bit in a 32-bit command word w and v1 is a high
bit in w, so that, after illegally masking the higher bits of w, v0 is still correctly visible, but v1 has been
illegally set to 0.
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Test: Path-delay
In this test, the environment for compartment Comp2 is modiﬁed in a way
that the sensors will send a sequence of ALARM → STANDBY → ALARM →
STANDBY → . . . to the SDCU. As can be seen from the test log, the environment
alternates the values for smoke and temperature and the corresponding sensors
change their state accordingly. The environment is set to “no ﬁre”, so are the
sensors SD5,6:
TM 00010026978 AM 4 O : ( 18 ) ENVIRONMENT:
: ----------------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: HUMIDITY: 5 5 5 5
: SMOKE: 90 2 90 2
: TEMP: 30 20 30 20
TM 00010027377 AM 4 O : ( 18 ) SENSORS SDS:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
: DEFECT: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
TM 00010027856 AM 4 O : ( 18 ) SDCU:
: --------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
In the next test step, the environment is set to “ﬁre” and the sensors change
their states accordingly:
TM 00010526998 AM 4 O : ( 19 ) ENVIRONMENT:
: ----------------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: HUMIDITY: 5 5 5 5
: SMOKE: 90 90 90 2
: TEMP: 30 30 30 20
TM 00010527398 AM 4 O : ( 19 ) SENSORS SDS:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
: DEFECT: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
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TM 00010527908 AM 4 O : ( 19 ) SDCU:
: --------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
Again, the environment is set to “no alarm”. The sensors are set to state standby.
TM 00011027004 AM 4 O : ( 20 ) ENVIRONMENT:
: ----------------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: HUMIDITY: 5 5 5 5
: SMOKE: 90 2 90 2
: TEMP: 30 20 30 20
TM 00011027416 AM 4 O : ( 20 ) SENSORS SDS:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
: DEFECT: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
TM 00011027874 AM 4 O : ( 20 ) SDCU:
: --------------------
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
Also it can be noticed that the SDCU is not changing the state for Comp2.
Therefore the occurrence of a path delay error can be excluded.
4.4.4 Falsiﬁcation tests for missing transition errors.
An omitted transition means that the SUT illegally remains in a given state, though
a new trigger event occurred. This situation can be uncovered by black-box tests,
using the characterisation traces of the state machine deﬁning the transition (see [4]
for details): The test execution is extended by additional input sequences, so that
the associated SUT reactions reveal whether the required transition has been per-
formed or not.
For our system, a command to dump the internal BITE (Built-In Test Equip-
ment) memory can be used as such an additional input sequence 7 : Every alarm is
not only indicated on the compAlarm[c] interfaces, but also recorded in the internal
BITE memory whose contents can be accessed using commands sent to the SDCU
via AFDX.
7 Not shown here due to space constraints.
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4.4.5 Falsiﬁcation tests for Stuck-at-0/1 errors.
For suspected stuck-at-0/1 errors 8 , a test is designed in such a way that a change in
the output interface y where the failure was observed only depends on a single input
x. Then x is changed in such way that it should trigger corresponding y changes.
If these occur, a “stuck-at situation” cannot be present.
Test: Stuck-at-zero
In our case, we perform a test where SD5 stays continuously in state ALARM,
while the state of SD6 is toggled between STANDBY and ALARM. Then, in a
correctly operating SUT, an output compAlarm[2]=1 should occur if and only if SD6
is in state ALARM. In the following test log, it can be seen that no compartment
alarm for Comp2 is raised because only sensor SD5 is in state ALARM whereas
sensor SD6 remains in state STANDBY. This is the expected behaviour.
TM 00021029341 AM 4 O : ( 20 ) SDCU:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
TM 00022029307 AM 4 O : ( 21 ) SDCU:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
In the next steps, both sensors are in state ALARM, which can be seen in the
test execution log. But still no alarm for compartment Comp2 is signalled.
TM 00023029318 AM 4 O : ( 22 ) SDCU:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
8 For integrated circuits this is discussed in [10, pp. 335ﬀ]
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TM 00024029314 AM 4 O : ( 23 ) SDCU:
: ---------------------------------------
: SENSOR ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: ALARM: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
: FAILURE: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: STANDBY: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
: COMP: 1 2 3 4
: ALARM: 1 0 1 0
As a consequence, this test could not falsify the stuck-at-0 fault.
4.4.6 Repeated Application of Steps 3 and 4.
If all fault hypotheses in the fault tree elaborated in Step 3 have been falsiﬁed, but
the tree has not been completely reﬁned, then we return to Step 3 to further extend
selected leaves of the fault-tree. After that, Step 4 is repeated.
If the tree was completely reﬁned and no error was found during the execution
of these steps, there is a good chance that one of the additional tests failed to cover
the problem. In this case there are only two ways of detecting the error: either to
start at the end of the trees and do “backtracking” or to start at the beginning,
performing validations for each additional test. The choice of further actions then
depends on the speciﬁc problem and will not be elaborated here.
4.5 Step 5: Error Identiﬁcation
In our case, all fault hypotheses but the potential stuck-at-0 fault can be falsi-
ﬁed by means of additional tests. The internal structure of the SDCU must be
taken into account, so that the global input variables sensorSDSAlarm[] of the
processMessages() method become visible. An additional unit test of this method
reveals the presence of a stuck-at-0 fault within this method.
In order to aid with error diagnosis on source-code level a software tool has
been developed: Using the interval analysis techniques described in [7, pp. 9ﬀ]
(based on [9]), the Interactive Interval Analyser can easily help to identify the
error. The Interval Analyser works on compiler-generated control ﬂow graph (CFG)
information. The user can select a CFG (which corresponds to a function) from
the compilation unit. Subsequently a window containing the function’s inputs and
outputs is displayed: The inputs are global variables as well as function parameters,
while the outputs are again global variables and the function’s return value.
The user may now change the intervals assigned to the inputs and the Analyser
will interactively show the impact of the changes on the outputs (Fig. 5).
The Analyser can also be used in combination with Veriﬁed’s RT-Tester User
Interface (RTTUI). It is then possible to observe the code coverage achieved with
the current input intervals. The RTTUI will display the CFG ﬁle 9 and colourise all
blocks that have been reached during the last execution. This feature can be used for
9 Displaying the original C/C++ source code is currently not possible. This feature is planned for a later
version.
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error diagnosis: Setting both inputs sensorSDSAlarm[5] and sensorSDSAlarm[6]
to the interval [1, 1] does not lead to coverage of block 8 (where compAlarm[2]
would have been set to 1), as shown in Fig. 6.
The last step is to match the corresponding lines of code to the block 8 of the
CFG. This leads to the position where the error is located within the source code:
Fig. 5. Interval Analyser
Fig. 6. Covered CFG blocks shown in RT-Tester UI.
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if ( sensorSDSAlarm[5] && sensorSDSAlarm[13] ) {
compAlarm[2] = 1;
}
This reveals the observed error: for compartment Comp2, the alarm
decision depends on sensorSDSAlarm[5] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[13] instead of
sensorSDSAlarm[5] ∧ sensorSDSAlarm[6].
5 Conclusion
Our experience has shown that it is possible to locate any kind of fault when follow-
ing the presented procedures (and reﬁnements). Being state of the art for semicon-
ductor error diagnostics, to our knowledge the presented strategy for fault detection
is not yet commonly used within the area of distributed embedded systems. Through
the tight integration of the procedures with the tool chain a reliable and eﬃcient
way of testing is introduced. The tool chain, consisting of the RT-Tester, its user
interface (RTTUI) and the Interval Analyser, can be supplemented by tools 10 like
Relex FTA or Isograph FaultTree+ for fault tree analysis.
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